Banking on Physics!

City College Interdisciplinary Seminar April 2015

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Outline

- Physics & Finance
- Current State of Banking
- Risk & History of Banking
- Central Banks, Regulation of Banks, Lending & Inflation
- Fixing Banking

My History

- ♦ Thirteen years in applied physics, engineering, theoretical physics, applied math
- ♦ Recruited to Wall Street (by Citibank physicist)
- ♦ Seven employers in 22 years in finance

Physicists' Habits and Traits

- ♦ Solving problems and "figuring things out"
- ♦ Need always to be on a learning curve (??)

PHYSICISTS IN FINANCE

To a physicist facing significant difficulty in the job market, the allure of a career in finance is obvious: The industry has numerous opportunities that demand the physicist's quantitative skills, and pay handsomely for them. Those contemplating such a move, however, need to look beyond these immediate considerations, for the culture of fi-

nance differs markedly from that of physics, having different goals and philosophies, work styles, even dress codes. To be successful on Wall Street, the physicist must willingly adapt to Wall Street's ways.

To add precision to the phrase "physicists in finance," I am using "physicists" to denote PhD recipients and "finance" to refer to the disciplines that require the greatest mathematical and computational skills, such as derivative pricing and construction, risk management and investigation of trading strategies. It is somewhat unjust

Though the challenges of "quantitative finance" are diverse and often exhilarating, success for the erstwhile physicist is not at all assured. What factors are involved in making the transition to finance?

Joseph M. Pimbley

directly into finance following graduate school or from a postdoctoral position. Less common are the émigrés from full-time "legitimate" physicist positions. Certainly this observation implies that one cause of the physics-to-finance transition is the shortage of jobs in physics, especially for those just starting their careers. But it is regrettable

that younger physicists, who have not had the opportunity to explore their chosen disciplines and their abilities on their own, are more likely to shift career goals. Older colleagues, by contrast, have orchestrated successful research projects with lasting contributions, and are therefore much better equipped to contemplate leaving the physics profession. They know what they are forsaking and how their philosophies will change.

Although scientists and engineers consider themselves technical people, "technical" has a different meaning

Physics Today, January 1997
Maxwell-consulting.com/Physicists Finance low mem.pdf

Value and Success

- ♦ Since goal is to "seek truth," must also seek

 outside the realms of physical phenomena, math,

 visualization, et cetera
- ♦ Other skills: People; Presentation; Writing; Multi-Lingual; All Communication; Information Research and Synthesis; Judgment
- ♦ Arrogance & Humility

Seeking Truth

- → Truth is not the priority of virtually all organizations ... often Truth is the enemy!
- ♦ How physicists have failed
 - ♦ Use of models
 - ♦ Finance has shaped physicists
- ♦ How physicists have succeeded
 - ♦ Emphasis on data
 - ♦ Growing awareness of model risk
 - ♦ Displacing economists


Money, Blood and Revolution

- ♦ Book recommendation!
- ♦ George Cooper argues economics is "in crisis"
- ♦ Best parts are:

 - ❖ Elaboration that people will continue to use (and even believe) theories, methods, and orthodoxy that are proven wrong UNTIL there are replacements

Current State of Banking

What do Banks do?



Current State of Banking

- ♦ Fail frequently and taxpayers "must" support
- ★ Existence of regulation sensible due to the government liability ("moral hazard")
- ♦ But regulation to "prevent" failures is intrusive, expensive, and ineffective (eg, former CEO BB&T)
- ♦ Failing, weak, or zombie banks reduce lending which decreases money supply => deflation


Current State of Banking

Observations of Several Sources

- → Mismatch of assets and liabilities is historical mistake (risk management principle)
- ♦ Regulation has failed and will fail see Sheila Bair Bull by the Horns – purported capital models are entirely wrong; regulators are "trapped"

Business Failures


- → Hundreds of thousands of businesses fail
 annually in the U.S. (roughly 30 million total)
- ♦ Gov't does not save non-banks (GM and Chrysler aside), why try to prevent bank failures?
- ♦ Old J.P. Morgan version of capitalism quite different – competition ruinous to bondholders – form Trusts and monopolies



Huge Leverage – Typical of Banks and Similar Financial Entities

| Company/Bank | Total Liabilities (\$ billion) | Equity (\$ billion) | L/E | Date of 10-K | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------|--------------|--|
| Citigroup | 1,670 | 204 | 8.19 | Dec-13 | |
| JP Morgan Chase | 2,160 | 211 | 10.2 | Dec-13 | |
| Goldman Sachs | 833 | 78.5 | 10.6 | Dec-13 | |
| Google | 23.6 | 87.3 | 0.270 | Dec-13 | |
| Intel | 34.1 | 58.3 | 0.585 | Dec-13 | |
| Procter & Gamble | 70.6 | 68.1 | 1.04 | Jun-13 | |
| Merck | 53.3 | 49.8 | 1.07 | Dec-13 | |
| Walmart | 122 | 76.0 | 1.61 | Jan-14 | |
| Target | 28.3 | 16.2 | 1.75 | Jan-14 | |
| JC Penney | 8.71 | 3.09 | 2.82 | Jan-14 | |
| Amazon | 30.4 | 9.75 | 3.12 | Dec-13 | |
| Kellogg Company | 11.9 | 3.55 | 3.35 | Dec-13 | |
| General Electric | 520 | 131 | 3.97 | Dec-13 | |
| United Parcel Service | 29.7 | 6.47 | 4.59 | Dec-13 | |
| Deere & Company | 49.3 | 10.3 | 4.79 | Oct-13 | |
| Campbell Soup | 7.11 | 1.22 | 5.83 | Jul-13 | |
| Clorox | 4.17 | 0.146 | 28.6 | Jun-13 | |
| American Airlines | 45.0 | (2.73) | NM | Dec-13 | |
| United Continental | 33.8 | 2.98 | 11.3 | Dec-13 | |

Bank Leverage is Much Higher That That of Other Corporate Entities



Bank Failure Rate is DEFAULT Rate in the absence of government rescue / bailout

Fitch Global Corporate Finance Average Cumulative Default Rates: 1990–2012

| (%) | One-Year | Two-Year | Three-Year | Four-Year | Five-Year | 10-Year |
|-------------------|----------|----------|------------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| AAA | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| AA | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| Α | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.41 | 0.57 | 0.76 | 1.93 |
| BBB | 0.20 | 0.68 | 1.23 | 1.84 | 2.45 | 4.73 |
| BB | 1.05 | 2.80 | 4.46 | 5.97 | 6.91 | 11.55 |
| В | 2.02 | 4.79 | 7.24 | 9.50 | 10.52 | 11.60 |
| CCC to C | 24.88 | 31.87 | 35.59 | 38.32 | 36.84 | 43.75 |
| | | | | | | |
| Investment Grade | 0.12 | 0.36 | 0.64 | 0.92 | 1.22 | 2.29 |
| Speculative Grade | 2.99 | 5.53 | 7.66 | 9.51 | 10.25 | 14.14 |
| All Corporates | 0.74 | 1.45 | 2.08 | 2.63 | 2.95 | 4.14 |
| Source: Fitch. | | | | | | |

Banks are JUNK!!

(Bank "Failure Rating" is below Investment Grade)

History of Banking



Deposits are Bank Debt with Daily Maturity
Risky and Unstable!
"Run on the Bank"

History of Banking

- ♦ Bank Deposits are Debt Obligations of the Bank
- ♦ Depositors May Withdraw Funds at ANY TIME with NO Advance Notice
- ♦ Yet Banks DO NOT HOLD CASH (or reserves)
 to Pay Depositors
- ♦ Bank Failures Always Begin with "Runs"

History of Banking

- ♦ Depositors are thus DEBT INVESTORS in the Bank and have Risk to Bank Activities yet can redeem at par on demand

Central Banks, Regulation, Lending & Inflation

- ♦ Swedish Riksbank (1668) / Bank of England
 (1694) formed as "funding arms" to government
- ♦ Myth of "central bank independence" which is a good idea! – history's theme is government destruction of the country's money
- ♦ Central banks "control the money" monetary policy
- ♦ Central banks inspect and regulate the "private banks" to prevent panics and failures

Central Banks, Regulation, Lending & Inflation

- ❖ Fractional reserve bank lending increases the money supply (common in textbooks but puzzling!)
- ❖ Prices in the economy inflation and deflation depend directly on money supply, so change in the level of bank lending pushes prices up or down
- ♦ Capital adequacy requirement encourages deleveraging after losses with resulting deflation as (fractional reserve) bank lending falls

- ♦ "Reserve Requirement" → 100%
- ♦ Drastic Change, but easy to implement!
- ♦ Split each Bank into "Bank A" and "Bank B"
- ♦ Bank Deposits "Completely Safe"

The Chicago Plan Revisited

Author/Editor: Benes, Jaromir; Kumhof, Michael

Publication Date: August 01, 2012

Electronic Access: Free Full text (PDF file size

Use the free Adobe Acroba

FullReserveBanking.com

A collection of resources for anyone interested in this alternative monetary system

Narrow Banking

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Abstract

This review discusses the history of narrow banks, reform proposals involving narrow banks, and theory and empirical evidence regarding whether narrow banks should play a more prominent role in the financial system. Prior to the early-twentieth century, US banks tended to be much narrower than they are today. Common modern banking practices, such as maturity transformation and explicit loan commitments, arose only after the creation of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. My review of theory and empirical evidence finds it largely

supportive of narro banking system co hazard and reducir financial system.

The University of Chicago



Web resources

Papers

Definition

Proposals

Organisations

FAQ

Some people dismiss Full Reserve Banking (the opposite of Fractional Reserve Banking) as a crazy system not taken seriously by any leading economists. This is entirely false. As recently as 2010, Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England, said in a letter to a full reserve banking

You might be aware that I have said publicly that I think ideas in this spirit - such as those advocated by John Kay - certainly merit serious consideration in the debate as to how we reform our financial system. I remain sympathetic to these views.

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Keywords

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JEL codes: G21,

Irving Fisher and the 100 Percent Reserve Proposal

Author(s): William R. Allen

Source: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Oct., 1993), pp. 703-717


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
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iety. Chicago: University of

in Mathews & Marrot, 1931. rge Routledge & Sons, 1934.



Split Each Bank into "Bank A" and "Bank B"



Transition to 100% Reserve over Five Years Banks <u>already</u> have Excess Reserves!

DEFLATION PROBLEM!

- → Full Reserve Banking decreases Money Supply
- ♦ Deflation would be "confusing" and detrimental to debtors
- ♦ Solution: "Quantitative Easing" to maintain price level during transition period ONLY



What would the Central Bank buy in its QE?
More Government Debt?!

- Banks fail frequently
- Choice of high leverage and A-L mismatch
- Gov't support due to fear of bank failures
- Fractional reserve banking ties bank lending (and solvency and health) to full economy
- Solution: eliminate fractional reserve banking and do not rescue "Bank B"